By : WONG CHIN HUAT who is anelectoral system expert at Jeffrey Sachs Centre on Sustainable Development, Sunway University. He also leads the clusters on electoral systems and constituency delimitation as part of the government’s Electoral Reform Committee (ERC)
Interesting analysis on d coup d’etat by Perikatan Nasional (PN)...
Theoretically, the longevity of PN government ranges from 11 weeks to a maximum of 38 months if Tun M can pull more people and deny him a working majority when the Parliament reconvenes on May 18, 2020.
My guess is it will be in between the two extremes, hinging on three factors as explained below.
With the rising Covid-19 outbreak and the on-going US-China trade war, PN comes into power in one of the most trying times for Malaysia. If external factors have contributed to Pakatan Harapan’s less than satisfactory performance in economy, on top of its own shortcomings, they are unlikely to be kind to PN.
PH had some under-performing ministers who were chosen because of the party hierarchy and demographic quota.
With a smaller pool of MPs from BN (42), Bersatu (31?), PAS (18), GPS (18) and a handful of minor parties and independent, Muhyiddin’s hands are tight to form a more competent cabinet to deliver economic growth.
Any ministers who shine amidst such mediocracy, like one may expect Hishamuddin Hussein or Khairy Jamaluddin to be, will quickly emerge as Muhyiddin’s likely successor.
As it takes only a few parliamentarians to switch side and bring down the government, Muhyiddin will likely be held to ransom by frogs.
Therefore, Muhyiddin will likely have more than 28 ministers and 27 deputy ministers in the last administration, possibly reaching around 65 in total, and appoint most backbenchers to head statutory bodies or GLCs.
Once the dust is settled temporarily, barring major disasters like economic meltdown, the longevity of Muhyiddin’s government may depend on three factors ... corruption trials, the unity of three Malay parties and ethnic relations.
FACTOR 1:
CORRUPTION TRIALS.
Muhyiddin’s immediate test is whether to let the high-profile corruption trials continue as it would have been under PH. The candidate for the next AG would be an indicator where the wind will blow.
As of now, six out of Umno’s 39 MPs: Najib Abdul Razak, Ahmad Zahid Hamidi, Tengku Adnan Tengku Mansor, Ahmad Mazlan, Abdul Azeez Abdul Rahim, and Bung Mokhtar, are on trial for corruption, breach of trust and/or money laundering. That’s five percent strong of Muhyiddin’s parliamentary majority.
Muhyiddin’s best bet is to be Malaysia’s Kim Yong Sam. Kim was the South Korean opposition leader who merged his party with President Roh Tae Woo’s party in 1990 and went on to win the presidential election in 1992.
Three years later, Roh and his predecessor Chun Doo Hwan were charged first for corruption, then mutiny and treason. Chun and Roh were sentenced for life and 17 years but pardoned by Kim in 1997.
I doubt Najib and Zahid would appreciate Chun and Roh’s fate even if Muhyiddin can promise to secure pardon.
Muhyiddin would be soon in a dilemma. If his AG does not let Najib and Zahid walk free, they may plot to topple him. However, if his AG does so, protests will await Muhyiddin. When protests get big enough, frogs will jump again in the name of national interests, and his government collapses.
FACTOR 2:
MALAY UNITY WITH THREE MALAY PARTIES.
If PH’s Achilles’ heel was the component parties were too different from each other, PN’s would be exactly the opposite: Umno, Bersatu and PAS are too similar.
Paradoxically, you cannot have Malay unity with three Malay parties in government even that’s what they have been shouting all along. The marriages of Umno-PAS (1973-1977) and PAS-S46 (1990-1996) all ended up in bitter divorce.
Once the dust settles, PN will have to make a fundamental decision: should they form a permanent coalition or should they prepare to stand against each other in GE15? Delay makes the latter as the default option until it is reversed.
If their alliance is expected to end before GE15, they will watch and check on each other, grab as many positions and resources as possible, to prepare for the next battle.
The rivalry and rift between the trio grow as every day passes, counting down to July 15, 2023, when the Parliament must stand dissolved.
What if they choose to formalise their union like PH? Well, they will encounter the same problem as PH. The rivalry for dominance between the smaller Bersatu and the larger PKR will happen between the smaller Bersatu and the larger Umno, added PAS on the side.
All these three parties were largely contesting against each other in GE14, if a permanent coalition is formed, how many and which seats should go to which party in GE15?
The inconvenient fact is, for every Malay candidate who gets to represent PN, there will likely be two aspirants who are dropped and unhappy.
Ultimately, Malay unity requires not a permanent coalition but one single party. However, then some big fishes in their small pond will become small fishes in the bigger pond, why should these fishes go for a merger?
Given their similarity and past ties, Umno and Bersatu may eventually merge but that would seriously put PAS in a very disadvantaged position and PAS may then pull out to force a snap poll.
FACTOR 3:
COMMUNAL RELATIONS.
The third factor that will decide PN’s longevity is communal relations between Malays and non-Malays.
The dynamic is most counter-intuitive and you may find it mind-boggling. I will break it into three parts.
First, despite all three main parties in PN are Malay-based, the government will try to be moderate at least for the start. This is why Muhyiddin who said he was “Malay first, Malaysian second” as BN’s DPM now wants to be a PM for everyone and PAS also called for national unity.
This is not just because they hope to win back some non-Malays’ hearts and some mixed seats in GE15. More fundamentally, ethnoreligious strife – which may help shore up opposition’s support - is bad for the economy and the government, which they are now.
Second, ironically, Bersatu, Umno and PAS may soon find themselves in the ‘DAP dilemma’.
While DAP is seen by many Malays as too assertive for minority rights, it had retreated a lot from its previous position when in opposition. Their representatives restrained from speaking up on many issues to the extent it was called the ‘Diam Diam Party’ by some Chinese.
The DAP dilemma is one of market repositioning. If a coffee shop has built up a loyal customer base with super-strong ‘kopi-o kaw kaw’, turning around and selling ‘decaf coffee’ will invite backlashes.
That is what will likely meet Umno, PAS and Bersatu politicians that have played up the non-Malay/non-Muslim dominance. Now they are in power unchecked by the non-Malays (MCA and MIC will be more yesman than during BN time). Their supporters will ask them to deliver changes PH Malay parties that had been accused of not making.
The ‘DAP dilemma’ will hit hardest on PAS, whose supporters may push for implementation of Hudud punishments / closing down of casino in Genting Highlands / the Heineken beer brewery near the Federal Highway.
Any of these moves will scare away foreign investment and drive the economy downward when the Covid-19 outbreak is threatening a global recession. If PAS supporters do not mind such economic cost ... Umno, Bersatu, Malay aristocrats and businesspeople, and many ordinary Malays do.
So, PN Malay parties will need to do some symbolic measures to signal their commitment to the Malay agenda but not rocking the boat, so that they won’t look increasingly like PKR, as how DAP was accused of becoming the MCA in PH.
Third, the most intriguing part of this dynamics, is that the PN Malay parties may be saved from both their ‘DAP dilemma’ and ‘Malay unity’ problem by the non-Malays.
As long as non-Malays over-react to their pro-Malay policies, to the extent that the ordinary Malays feel threatened and demand PN parties to be united, PN will stay intact and GE15 a foregone conclusion.
On the other hand, de-escalation of ethnic tensions will cause de-orientation of PN parties and accelerate their internal contradiction.
Muhyiddin’s mission impossible
Muhyiddin said he takes up the top job to end the country’s political crisis. I believe in his desire but doubt his capability. Beyond personalities, much of PH’s weakness lies in both the political system and social division, which PN now inherits.
Hence, a backdoor government based on shady deals is unlikely to do a better job than PH. Worse, coup begets coup and defection begets defection.
TQ for reading. Please share to as many as possible🙏!...